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Abstract: A thought experiment is a form of academic interaction in which two or 
more scholars discuss based on an imaginary scenario the acceptability of an aca-
demic claim. The argumentative dimension of thought experiments has been the 
subject of intense debates: for some scholars, thought experiments are nothing but 
arguments; for others, they cannot be arguments. In this paper I propose approach-
ing the argumentative dimension of thought experiments with pragma-dialectical re-
construction tools. After a brief outline of the main positions taken with respect to 
the	argumentative	dimension	of	 thought	experiments,	 I	 explain	 the	benefits	of	 the	
proposed approach and I illustrate these by reconstructing a thought experiment as 
an exchange of argumentative moves. I conclude by reassessing the main positions 
taken in the debate.
Keywords: Thought experiments, argumentation, pragma-dialectics, speech acts.
Resumen: Un experimento del pensamiento es una forma académica de interacción 
en la que dos o más académicos discuten basados en un escenario imaginario respecto 
de la aceptabilidad de una pretensión académica. La dimensión argumentativa de un 
experimento del pensamiento ha sido materia de intenso debate: para algunos inves-
tigadores, los experimentos del pensamiento no son otra cosa que argumentos; para 
otros, ellos no pueden ser argumentos. En este trabajo propongo aproximarnos a la 
dimensión argumentativa de los experimentos del pensamiento con las herramientas 
de reconstrucción de la pragma-dialéctica. Después de una breve descripción de las 
principales posiciones respecto de la dimensión argumentativa de los experimentos 
del	pensamiento,	explico	los	beneficios	del	acercamiento	propuesto	y	los	ilustro	re-
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construyendo un experimento del pensamiento en tanto intercambio de movimientos 
argumentativos. Concluyo reconsiderando las posiciones centrales del debate.
Palabras clave: Experimentos del pensamiento, argumentación, pragma-dialéctica, 
actos de habla.
1. Introduction
Thought experiments are instances of academic communicative interaction 
in	which	imaginary	scenarios	(i.e.	stories	about	fictional	objects	and	events)	
are employed for the purpose of testing academic claims. Some well-known 
thought experiments are the Chinese Room thought experiment (Searle, 
1980), the Twin Earth thought experiment (Putnam, 1973; 1996), and the 
Falling bodies thought experiment (Galilei, 1954). The question I want 
to address in this paper is a deceptively simple one: Are thought experi-
ments arguments? The question has sprung long-lasting debates between 
philosophers and scientists: to some, the answer is clearly ‘Yes’; to others, 
it is clearly ‘No.’ While scholars generally agree that thought experiments 
have some argumentative features, it seems that analysing these features in 
more detail is problematic. 
Let me introduce an example of a thought experiment that will serve as 
an illustration for this paper. The imaginary scenario in this thought exper-
iment was set forth by Frank Jackson in a paper entitled Epiphenomenal 
qualia (Jackson, 1982). The paper as a whole is concerned with a philo-
sophical principle known as ‘physicalism.’ According to this principle, the 
world is entirely physical, meaning that every event can be reduced to, and 
thus understood in terms of, an interaction of physical entities – roughly 
speaking, particles in motion.1 Jackson, who opposes this principle, con-
structed	an	imaginary	scenario	in	which	a	“brilliant	scientist”	investigates	
the world from a peculiar black-and-white room. The relevant passage is 
the following:
1 For a more detailed analysis of physicalism and its relationship with this thought 
experiment, see the collection of papers in Ludlow, Nagasawa and Stoljar, Eds. (2004).
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Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the 
world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She 
specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the 
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe 
tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for 
example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and 
exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal 
chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 
‘The sky is blue’ […] 
(Jackson, 1982, p. 130)
On the basis of this imaginary scenario, Jackson judges physicalism to be 
false:
10
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[…] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is 
given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just 
obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. 
But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had 
all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is 
false. Clearly the same style of Knowledge argument could be deployed for taste, 
hearing, the bodily sensations and generally speaking for the various mental states 
which are said to have (as it is variously put) raw feels, phenomenal features or 
qualia. The conclusion in each case is that the qualia are left out of the physicalist 
story. And the polemical strength of the Knowledge argument is that it is so hard to 
deny the central claim that one can have all the physical information without having 
all the information there is to have.
(Jackson, idem)
Jackson calls this “the Knowledge argument”	(line	15)	and	it	 is	 indeed	a	
common	practice	to	use	the	terms	“thought	experiment”	and	“argument”	
interchangeably.2 Nevertheless, some scholars have vehemently disputed 
equating thought experiments with arguments. The debate between what 
might	be	called	the	“argument	view”	and	the	“no-argument	view”	will	be	
outlined	in	the	following	section.	At	this	point,	let	me	briefly	note	that	nei-
ther side seems to be in the grip of some obvious misjudgement. For, on 
2	For	 “the	Chinese	room	argument”	see	Damper	 (2004)	and	Searle	 (2006);	 for	 “the	
Twin	Earth	argument”	see	Stalnaker	(1993).
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the one hand, the presence of an imaginary scenario which is supposed 
rather than asserted,	 conflicts	with	 the	 typical	 conception	 of	 arguments	
as made up of, or based on, assertions (Fisher, 1989, p. 402). If Jackson’s 
contribution turns out to be one big argument after all, we must, it seems, 
explain away these non-assertive acts. On the other hand, the whole point 
of the text is clearly that of having the audience (i.e. those who are more or 
less committed to physicalism) convince that physicalism is in fact false. 
But then, if the text turns out to be one big non-argumentative stretch of 
discourse after all, the use of “ergo”	in	line	14,	to	name	only	the	most	con-
spicuous argumentative indicator, needs to be explained away. 
The existence of such prima-facie cases on both sides is probably what 
kept	the	above-mentioned	debate	going	since	the	first	sparkle	in	the	early	
1990s. The point of this paper is to show that, when looked at from a cer-
tain pragmatic perspective, the apparent bind between these two opposing 
answers is just that – an apparent bind. 
2. The vague argumentative dimension of thought experiments 
Until the early 1990s, thought experiments were discussed only in passing, 
and more as curious cases in the history of science rather than prototypi-
cal forms of academic discourse (Kuhn, 1977; Popper, 1992 [1968]; Fodor, 
1964; Mach, 1976 [1889]). Subsequently, several monographs and collec-
tions of essays lead to a more thorough investigation of the practice (Horow-
itz & Massey, 1991; Brown, 1991; Norton, 1991; 1996; 2004; Gendler, 1996; 
2000; Bishop, 1999; De Mey, 2003; Häggqvist, 1996; 2007; Frappier, 
Meynell, & Brown, 2013). One of the questions that fuelled these investiga-
tions concerns what we might call the argumentative dimension of thought 
experiments:	Are	 they,	as	Norton	put	 it,	 “merely	picturesque	arguments”	
(Norton, 2004, p. 1139), or is it the case, as Bishop put it, that “thought ex-
periments	cannot	be	arguments”	(Bishop,	1999,	p.	540)?	I	refer	to	these	two	
positions	as	the	“argument	view”	and	the	“no-argument	view”	respectively.
For	Norton	“to	conduct	a	thought	experiment	is	to	execute	an	argument”	
(1996, p. 356). More concretely, thought experiments are “arguments that 
carry us from our assumptions to a conclusion […] Insofar as the device 
merely reorganizes, it is a deductive argument; insofar as it generalizes in 
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the	broadest	 sense,	 it	 is	an	 inductive	argument	 ”	 (Norton,	 ibid., p. 335). 
Just as Rescher (1991), Picha (2011), and other proponents of this view, 
Norton defends his position by showing that a thought experiment can be 
reconstructed as an argument – the assumption being that if something 
can be reconstructed as an argument, it is an argument. This is sometimes 
referred	to	as	the	“elimination	thesis”	(Gendler,	2000),	one	of	 its	conse-
quences being that the original text of the thought experiment is eliminated 
and replaced by the reconstructed version (see Norton, 1996, pp. 341-6).
In reading an earlier version of this text, a colleague of mine pointed 
out that the argument view can effectively capture the argumentative di-
mension of thought experiments in a different way: a thought experi-
ment, my colleague suggested, is simply a reductio ad absurdum. This is 
an interesting variation on the ‘argument view,’ one that roughly follows 
Rescher (1991). To go back to Jackson’s case, if you are a physicalist and 
you claim that Mary does learn something new while having all physical 
knowledge, you are, so it seems, contradicting yourself. Jackson’s contribu-
tion has undoubtedly a ‘reductio feel’ to it. Yet one can easily take note of 
some structural differences (pre-analytically, for now). First, a reductio ad 
absurdum proceeds by assuming a proposition p to be true and, through 
various derivations that lead to a contradiction, demonstrates p to be false. 
But at no point in such a process does one need a full-blown imaginary 
scenario or any other kind of stories. Second, Jackson does not aim to show 
that physicalism is self-contradictory or that physicalism leads to a logical 
contradiction. Rather, Jackson’s puts forward a case to the effect that, since 
qualia	“are	left	out	of	the	physicalist	story”	(line	19),	one	should	desist	from	
maintaining the acceptability of the physicalist standpoint. Thus, to put it 
rather crudely, Jackson is not in the business of demonstrating logically, 
he is in the business of convincing (hence the importance of the “polemical 
strength”	of	the	argument,	see	line	19).
This is then, in broad strokes, the argument view. Let me now move to 
the no-argument view. According to Brown (1991; 2007), Arthur (1999) 
and Gendler (1998; 2000; 2004), to equate thought experiments with 
arguments is to miss some essential point about the practice. For exam-
ple, Brown argues that at least in some cases reconstructing thought ex-
periments as arguments would obscure the way in which the participants 
“grasp,”	 if	 all	 goes	well,	 abstract	 laws	and	entities.	Scholars	 refer	 to	 this	
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conception	as	the	“Platonic	view”	of	thought	experiments.	According	to	this	
strand within the no-argument view, thought experiments are devices that 
allow readers to see the laws of nature (Brown, 1991, pp. 75-86). In a simi-
lar vein, Gendler argues that the reconstruction test (i.e. basing the clas-
sification	on	our	ability	to	reconstruct	thought	experiments	as	arguments)	
is	unsatisfactory	since	the	analysis	misses	a	“quasi-observationally”	aspect	
of the practice (Gendler, 2004, p. 1154).  
There is another form of defence put forth for this ‘no-argument’ camp. 
Fisher (1989) and Bowels (1993) emphasize that thought experiments are 
based on suppositions, whereas	arguments	are,	by	definition,	based	on	as-
sertions. The speaker’s commitment, in each case, is clearly different. In 
the case of suppositions, one is not committed to the acceptability of the 
expressed propositional content, while in the case of assertions one is com-
mitted to its acceptability. In Jackson’s case, the writer asks us to suppose 
that Mary is in such-and-such situation, which is an altogether different act 
than affirming the situation actually took place. The imaginary scenario, 
then, is what throws off the equivalence between thought experiments and 
arguments (Fisher, 1989, p. 403). 
The variety of positions that have been taken in this debate is, of course, 
not captured by this short overview.3 Yet the crux of the discussion should 
be clear. Thought experiments seem to have an obvious argumentative di-
mension yet pinpointing this dimension brings one into conceptual prob-
lems. 
3. The use of a pragmatic approach
When a set membership is problematic and becomes the source of debates, 
one must be suspicious of talk at cross-purposes. After all, if the disagree-
ing	parties	are	working	with	the	same	definitions	and	within	the	same	ap-
proach, the matter is, so to speak, a computational one. The question “Does 
set A (‘argument’) include set T
 
(‘thought	experiment’)?”	would	be	straight-
forwardly answered by looking up T in A or by checking whether T fulfils	
3 For more detailed overviews see De Mey (2003) and Mouse, Masavetas and Karayi-
anni (2006).
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conditions for set-membership in A. Since this is not how the argument/
no-argument	debate	was	carried	out,	one	is	justified	in	surmising	that	(a)	
the super-set A is fuzzy or (b) the parties work with different methods for 
checking whether T is a sub-set of A.
I	think	that	both	(a)	and	(b)	reflect	to	some	extent	the	prevalent	situation	
in the argument/no-argument debate. The scholars involved in this debate 
do not work with the same concept of argument, nor do they work with 
the same reconstruction method. This becomes apparent when T is con-
stant, that is, when scholars employ one and the same instance of thought 
experimentation in order to defend their position in the debate. The Fall-
ing bodies thought experiment from Galileo’s Two new sciences is one 
such instance. When scholars such as Norton (1996, pp. 340-3), Häggqvist 
(1996, p. 114), Gendler (2000, p. 41), Atkinson (2003, pp. 219-24), and 
Picha (2011, p. 181) employ this particular thought experiment to defend 
their positions, they each reconstruct the thought experiment in a differ-
ent way and they arrive, not surprisingly, at different results. Furthermore, 
the origin of these differences remains unclear since they are, for the most 
part, ignored. The scholars debate ‘the nature of thought experiments’ and 
whether they produce a priori or a posteriori knowledge but, judging from 
the differences in their analyses, they do not seem to share enough com-
mon ground for actually tackling these issues based on concrete examples. 
Swept under the rug, the super-set A remains fuzzy and the reconstruction 
method remains a matter of personal interpretation.
The argumentation-theoretical approach I will be employing can bring 
some clarity into these issues. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumenta-
tion proposes tools for the reconstruction of speech acts performed in ex-
changes directed at resolving differences of opinion (van Eemeren & Groo-
tendorst, 1984; 2004; van Eemeren, 2010).4 It is one of the chief analyti-
cal tasks in pragma-dialectics to determine whether a text contains argu-
mentative moves and, if so, what kind of argumentative moves it contains 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, pp. 75-95). The theoretical model of 
a critical discussion, which	offers	a	specification	of	the	types	of	moves	that	
4 The theory also has a normative component consisting of dialectical rules for evalu-
ating argumentative discourse (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). For the present 
purpose, this normative component can be left aside. 
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can contribute to resolving a difference of opinion, is employed as a basis 
for carrying out these analytical tasks. In the case at hand, the question “Is 
Jackson’s	contribution	an	argument?”	will	be	answered	by	reconstructing	
Jackson’s speech acts in terms of a critical discussion. 
Before unfolding the details of the pragma-dialectical model of a criti-
cal discussion, let me answer two objections. First, one might object that 
analysing thought experimentation as an argumentative discussion (or a 
form of argumentative discourse) will in fact brings the ‘argument view’ 
through	the	back	door.	This	question	can	be	answered	briefly	by	pointing	
out that putting forward argumentation is but a part of having an argu-
mentative discussion. Other argumentative moves such as establishing a 
starting point, putting forward a standpoint, and asking a critical question 
have an equally important function in an argumentative discussion and are 
thus, alongside argumentation, part of what it means to test the acceptabil-
ity of a point of view. An analysis of Jackson’s contribution can – but need 
not – reveal that his speech acts must be reconstructed as the argumenta-
tive move ‘putting forward argumentation.’
A second and more substantive form of doubt regards the use of prag-
matic tools for tackling the set-membership under consideration. The ana-
lytical question of classifying thought experiments as arguments is often 
seen as an epistemological one or, in any case, as having epistemological 
consequences regarding our understanding of thought experimentation as 
a	 process	 of	 scientific	 discovery.	As	 such,	 some	 scholars	 involved	 in	 the	
above-mentioned debate might be sceptical of the choice of a theory of (ar-
gumentative) language-use. This objection can be met by pointing out that 
the ‘raw’ thought experiment is a piece of discourse. All entities that have 
received	the	label	“thought	experiment”	can	be	described	as	events	in	which	
one scholar aims to contribute to an academic dispute by putting forward 
a series of speech acts.5 While various epistemic processes are involved in 
putting forward these speech acts, we can get acquainted with these pro-
cesses only via the speech acts. What Jackson is expressing in written 
5 The interaction between the scholar and the audience need not, of course, be fully 
explicit. For instance, in Jackson’s case, the interaction with the physicalist readership is 
implicit – the text being monological – but that stretch of discourse can only be fully under-
stood if seen as a contribution to an ongoing discussion on the acceptability of physicalism.
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discourse is, so to speak, our only window towards his reasoning and the 
reasoning he expects from his readership (or, à la Brown, the grasping of 
whatever law Jackson might be said to defend). Understanding the kind of 
knowledge produced/employed during thought experimentation is, then, 
dependent on understanding the parties’ communicative interaction. 
I certainly do not mean to say that analysing Jackson’s linguistic be-
haviour from a pragma-dialectical perspective will solve the various epis-
temological problems that have arisen around thought experimentation. 
Questions such as “Is the thought experimenter’s conclusion based on 
empirical knowledge?”	 or	 “Does	 the	 thought	 experimenter’s	 conclusion	
count as new	knowledge?”	cannot	be	answered,	or	even	approached,	with	
pragmatic tools. But these questions are, nevertheless, dependent on our 
having a stable image of argumentative discourse (the super-set ‘A’) and a 
stable method for reconstructing Jackson’s argumentative moves. 
4. Argumentative moves in a thought experiment
A pragma-dialectical reconstruction starts from a basic distinction between 
settling and resolving a difference of opinion on the acceptability of a prop-
osition (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 81-2). Settling takes place 
when the parties involved decide to deal with their disagreement by turn-
ing to some external third-party authority or when they leave the matter to 
chance	(say,	by	flipping	a	coin).	Resolving	the	difference	of	opinion	is	a	pro-
cess in which the parties involved try to reach a decision regarding the ac-
ceptability of the proposition at issue by means of an argumentative discus-
sion. The analytical basis for reconstructing pieces of discourse as parts of 
an argumentative discussion is the above-mentioned ideal model of a criti-
cal discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 42-68). The critical 
discussion is to the argumentative discussion as the blueprint of a building 
is to the actual construction. When a speech act is reconstructed in terms of 
a critical discussion, the analyst categorizes it as an argumentative move 
performed by that speaker (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 62-7). 
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, p. 95-109; 2004, 
p. 67), four types of argumentative moves can be distinguished: moves 
performed via assertives, moves performed via commissives, moves per-
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formed via directives and moves performed via declaratives. Figure 1 of-
fers an overview of these four major types, together with the argumentative 
moves	performed	within	each	type	and	a	“standard	formulation.”6 
Figure 1. Types of argumentative moves in an argumentative discussion.
Type of 
speech act
Argumentative moves Sample formulations
Assertives Expressing a standpoint ‘I think p is the case.’
Advancing argumentation ‘q, so it should be clear that p.’
Commissives Accepting or rejecting 
standpoints/starting 
points
‘I do/don’t agree with 1’
Accepting or rejecting 
argumentation
‘Regardless of q, I disagree with p’
Directives Challenging to defend ‘Why would you say p is the case?’
Asking critical questions ‘But why would p follow from q?’
Requesting explanation/
definition
‘What do you mean by p…?
Proposing starting points ‘Let’s say p is the case…’
Declaratives Usage declaratives ‘By “rabbit” I mean any kind of 
rabbit’
Deciding to start/end a 
discussion
‘OK, we are in agreement now’
Establishing the result of 
a stage/of the discussion
‘So you see that p is the case after all’
6 The original formulation given by van Eemeren and Grootendorst was slightly modi-
fied	for	the	present	purposes.	First,	I	add	the	sub-type	of	proposals to the type of argumen-
tative moves performed through directives. Alongside requests and challenges, proposals 
cover those argumentative moves through which a participant attempts to get the other 
party to behave in a certain way (namely, to follow the proposed course of action). A second 
modification	is	 that	 the	speech	acts	 that	 involve	some	form	of	mutual	decision	taken	by	
both	parties	in	the	discussion,	moves	such	as	“deciding	to	start	the	discussion”	or	“estab-
lishing	the	result	of	the	discussion,”	are	classified	as	declaratives.	The	illocutionary	point	
of deciding something regarding the discussion is to create hitherto inexistent conditions 
in that discussion, an effect which is achieved by declaratives, i.e. by jointly declaring the 
condition	to	exist.	With	these	two	modifications,	the	applicability	of	the	model	to	thought	
experiments is increased, for, as it will become apparent, proposals and declaratives are 
key argumentative moves in a thought experiment.
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Examined through this model, a thought experiment will appear as a se-
quence of argumentative moves performed by two discussants in an at-
tempt to resolve their difference of opinion concerning the ‘targeted’ aca-
demic claim. It should be clear, given the distinctions in Figure 1, that there 
is more to an argumentative discussion than putting forward argumenta-
tion. While in everyday language we can refer to an entire discussion as an 
‘argument’ and to the parties involved as ‘arguing,’ this is strictly speaking 
a misnomer, for in a technical sense the speech act of argumentation is only 
one of the moves that can be performed in the resolution process. Let me 
now turn to Jackson’s contribution to the academic debate on physicalism.
The difference of opinion between Jackson and physicalists becomes ex-
plicit once both parties have put forward their standpoints with respect to 
the proposition that all knowledge is physical. Long before Jackson’s paper, 
physicalists have held a positive standpoint with respect to this proposi-
tion.7 Jackson’s negative standpoint can be reconstructed from his emphatic 
“ergo-move”	in	line	14	(“Ergo […] physicalism is false), but also, more di-
rectly, from an earlier passage in the same article, where he writes: “I think 
that there are certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also 
of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical in-
formation includes (Jackson, 1982, p. 127, emphasis added). Let us use the 
label C for the physicalist claim about the natural world and our knowledge 
of the world. The physicalist point of view will be C is the case, i.e. 
I assert that (C is the case),
while Jackson’s point of view will be that C is not the case, i.e.
I assert that (C is not the case).
Since both physicalists and Jackson have continued discussing the ac-
ceptability of C (see Ludlow et al., 2004), we might assume that at least part 
of what followed is an attempt to resolve the difference of opinion. The next 
step is thus to investigate the role of the imaginary scenario played in this 
7 See, for example, Neurath (1931). For further discussion of physicalism as a philo-
sophical principle see Pettit (1993).
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resolution	process.	For	ease	of	reference,	I	will	reproduce	the	first	part	of	
the original excerpt below.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the 
world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She 
specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the 
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe 
tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for 
example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and 
exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal 
chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 
‘The sky is blue’. 
(Jackson, 1982, p. 130)
Jackson’s speech acts from the beginning of this excerpt seem to be recon-
structible as assertives. However, the use of a let’s-construction in line 3 
(“let	us	suppose”)	clarifies	the	status	of	these	acts	as	proposals of a joint 
activity (Clark, 1993). In this case, the joint activity proposed is that of dis-
cussing the acceptability of C based on the imaginary scenario. I will use 
the term supposition for the propositions that make up the imaginary sce-
nario on the basis of which Jackson proposes to discuss. Examples of sup-
positions are thus: 
(supposition
1
) There is a scientist named Mary;
(supposition
2
) Mary is in the described situation;
(supposition
3
) Mary specializes in neurophysiology etc.
The set of all suppositions proposed in a certain discussion will be referred 
to as the scenario in that discussion. Jackson’s argumentative moves in 
lines 1-9 can thus be represented individually: 
I propose that (listener and I (discuss as if [supposition
1
] is true),
I propose that (listener and I (discuss as if [supposition2] is true), 
I propose that (listener and I (discuss as if [supposition
3
] is true), etc.
or they can be represented collectively as:
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I propose that (listener and I (discuss as if [scenario] is true)
Proposals of suppositions can prepare the way for the actual exchange 
of arguments but only if the other party accepts the proposal. However, 
since there is no turn-taking involved in the case at hand, the readers do 
not actually get the chance to respond to Jackson’s proposals. However, 
the other party’s acceptance of the proposals can be reconstructed from 
Jackson’s rhetorical questions in lines 9-10: “What will happen when Mary 
is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television 
monitor?	Will	she	learn	anything	or	not?”	Jackson’s	questions	about	Mary	
would be pragmatically odd unless the preceding proposals were (assumed 
to be) accepted. Put differently: had the situation been dialogical and had 
the listener rejected Jackson’s proposal, continuing to refer to Mary and 
her black-and-white monitor would have been uncooperative. The reader’s 
inevitable silence is then, rightfully or not, taken as a sign of acceptance. 
Mirroring the form of the argumentative moves above, these moves can be 
represented as follows:
I accept that (author and I (discuss as if [scenario] is true)
Notice that the predication act in both the proposal and the acceptance of 
the proposal is the same, namely, ‘discuss as if [scenario] is true.’ A pro-
posal-acceptance sequence that shares this predication act can be referred 
to as introducing suppositions (or introducing the scenario) in the discus-
sion. Introducing suppositions in a discussion involves both parties of the 
discussion: a party who proposes the scenario and a party who accepts it. 
Once the suppositions are introduced in the discussion, Jackson pro-
ceeds to discuss as if the scenario is true. He does so by advancing argu-
mentation in which the scenario appears as an antecedent. This is, gener-
ally speaking, what it means to suppose something for the sake of argu-
ment – it means to employ the supposed content as an antecedent in the 
assertives you bring forth as arguments. These assertives can contribute to 
the resolution process by convincing the other discussant of the unaccept-
ability of the discussed claim. The passage that interests us is emphasized 
below: 
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10
11
12
13
14
[…] or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems 
just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience 
of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she 
had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and 
Physicalism is false. 
(Jackson, 1982, p. 130)
Jackson does not begin every assertive in lines 11-13 with an explicit men-
tion of the scenario under which he is labouring. This would be tedious and 
unnecessary. Simple references to elements from the scenario (e.g. “she 
learns”	“her knowledge”)	are	enough	to	signal	that	his	assertives	are	to	be	
understood as conditionals with the scenario in the antecedent. Two such 
assertives make up Jackson’s main argument: on the one hand, Jackson 
asserts what would actually happen in that scenario, namely, Mary would 
learn something; on the other hand, Jackson asserts what would happen 
in that scenario if C were	 true,	namely,	Mary	would	not	 learn.	The	first	
one is made directly in line 11. The second one is made indirectly when the 
first	one	is	qualified	as	“inescapable”	(line	12),	suggesting	that	physicalists	
would be inclined to resist the consequence that, if C, Mary will not learn 
anything in the scenario. The relationship between these two assertives 
is represented as a simple argumentation structure (see van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 73-85).
1. ¬ (C)
1.1 If the scenario occurs, then Mary learns something new
1.1’ If C, then in the scenario, Mary doesn’t learn anything new
A full reconstruction of Jackson’s case against physicalism can take into 
considerations other parts of the quoted passage. For example, Jackson 
adds	“something	about	the	world	and	our	visual	experience	of	 it”	 in	 line	
11 which can be taken as a sub-argument for (1.1). Further, the addition 
“but she had all	the	physical	information”	in	line	12	–	note	Jackson’s	own	
emphasis	on	“all”	–	constitutes	a	way	of	compelling	physicalists	to	accept	
that which they might be tempted to resist in order to defend their position, 
namely, the consequence drawn from C that Mary does not learn anything 
new. Jackson’s claim is, then, that Mary’s having all the physical informa-
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tion	is	sufficient	for	claiming	Mary’s	learning	something	new.	Jackson’s	full	
case against C can be represented as a complex argumentation structure 
(see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 73-85).
1. ¬ C
1.1 If the scenario occurs, Mary learns something new
1.1.1 If the scenario occurs, Mary learns something about the 
visual experience of objects
(1.1.1’ Learning about visual experience in such a scenario is 
learning something new)
1.1’ If C, then if the scenario occurs, Mary does not learn anything new
1.1’.1 If the scenario occurs, Mary has all the physical infor-
mation
(1.1’.1’ In one has all the physical information in such a sce-
nario, then if C, one does not learn anything new
The	final	argumentative	move	made	by	Jackson	 is	 that	of	proposing the 
result of the argumentative discussion. Jackson performs this move by an-
nouncing,	in	the	emphatic	way	already	signalled,	that	physicalism	“is	false”	
(line 14). It should be obvious that Jackson is not thereby ending the dis-
cussion, since, conventionally speaking, academic disputes do not come to 
an end by decree. Thus, Jackson’s last move is not a declarative – which has 
been described as an argumentative move performed by both parties – but 
rather a proposal that the two parties perform this declarative, namely,
I propose (we declare (T was shown to be unacceptable) 
The discussion between Jackson and physicalists stretched for a long pe-
riod of time (Ludlow et al., 2004). Eventually, after physicalists themselves 
made other argumentative moves, Jackson retracted his negative stand-
point. The thereby established result is that C is acceptable after all. In 
Jackson’s own words:
On the face of it, physicalism about the mind across the board cannot 
be right. Any purely physical account of what goes on in us and of how 
we relate to our surroundings leaves out the phenomenal and conscious 
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side of psychology. […] I now think that what is, on the face of it, true is, 
on	reflection,	false.	I	now	think	that	we	have	no	choice	but	to	embrace	
some version or other of physicalism. (Jackson, 2004, p. xvi)
5. The argumentative dimension of thought experiments 
 revisited
The argumentative moves reconstructed from Jackson’s paper are not 
meant to exhaust the topic of the reconstruction of this and other thought 
experiments. They do, however, provide a basis for revisiting the argu-
ment/no-argument debate. 
What the analysis above has indicated is that, as a form of academic in-
teraction, putting forward a thought experiment consists of a variety of ar-
gumentative moves. The expression ‘to put forward a thought experiment’ 
covers in its present usage a more complex form of linguistic behavior than, 
say, ‘to put forward a question’ or even ‘to put forward an argument’. A 
more appropriate label would perhaps be ‘to engage in thought experimen-
tation’ – an expression that suggests more clearly the interactional char-
acter of the practice. An instance of thought experimentation is a struc-
tured dialogical process whose aim is (inter alia) to resolve a difference of 
opinion. We can only ‘see’ the antagonist’s moves, the protagonist’s moves 
being quoted, reported or left implicit, but this does not change the speak-
er’s argumentative moves. The antagonist is in the position of someone 
displaying his tangoing skills with an invisible partner: his moves are still 
meant as tango moves even though, as we know, the real process takes two. 
Approached in this way, it is fairly straightforward to note that thought 
experiments are not just arguments. Even though arguing is in a sense the 
most important of Jackson’s argumentative moves, it is not the only one. 
Other moves prepare the way for, and offer a continuation to, Jackson’s 
act of argumentation and it is the total of these moves that make up an in-
stance of thought experimentation. At the same time, and keeping in mind 
Fisher’s dilemma (either reconstruct the scenario as asserted or change the 
definition	of	argument),	it	is	equally	clear	that	those argumentative moves 
through which Jackson aims to convince physicalists are nothing but ar-
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guments. This dissolves the dilemma, for the presence of a propositional 
content that is supposed, viz. the imaginary scenario, does not go against 
a	definition	of	argumentation	as	a	complex	speech	act	based	on	assertives. 
Suppositions not being themselves speech acts, but rather propositional 
contents of various speech acts such as proposals or acceptances, the ‘as-
sertive-based’	definition	of	argumentation	and	the	idea	that	the	story	is	not 
asserted	fit	perfectly	together.	
This brings me to a last point concerning the role of assertives in thought 
experiments. As I have already mentioned in section 2, it is not unusual to 
point out that thought experiments are but rhetorically embellished reduc-
tio ad absurdum arguments. This is incorrect from a pragmatic point of 
view (given that a thought experiment is not only a set of assertives), but 
one might interpret the parallel in a logical sense, viz. “OK, a thought ex-
periment is an interaction in which the speech acts have various dialectical 
functions, but the assertives performed by one of the discussants support 
this discussant’s conclusion through a reductio structure.”	 This	 reading	
makes the parallel more acceptable but it is a rather limited analytical in-
sight for it concerns only the discussant’s (Jackson’s) argumentation at one 
level. A thought experimenter’s argumentation structure is more complex 
and does not need to assert (or posit, or assert provisionally or any such 
thing) the opposite of that which the discussant wishes to refute. These two 
structures are compared in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The structural differences between a reductio structure and the argu-
mentative structure in a thought experiment.
Reductio ad absurdum
argumentation
Argumentation in a thought 
experiment
1.  p 
1.1 q
1.1’ p   q
1.  p
1.1. scenario   r
1.1.1 scenario  s
…
1.1.1’ (q  s) (q 
 r)
1.1’ p  scenario  r
…
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What Figure 2 shows, aside from the difference in complexity, is that a 
thought experimenter’s argumentation contains only conditional state-
ments whereas a reductio must, at some point, lay claim to something re-
ally being the case.8 For mathematical demonstrations all this might be 
irrelevant, because one might jumble the variables in such a way so as to 
make the structure on the right be identical with the one on the left. But in 
a real-life argumentative discussion the two are different cases one brings 
against p. 
6. Conclusion
In light of what has been discussed, a reformulation of the main question 
seems	 fitting.	While	 not	 strictly	 speaking	 nonsensical,	 the	 question	 ‘Are	
thought experiments arguments?’ carries with it the presupposition that, 
pragmatically speaking, the label ‘thought experiment’ captures language-
use at the same level as, say, ‘claiming’ or ‘proposing.’ Because of its strange 
formulation, we might be inclined to answer it as follows: thought experi-
ments are simultaneously something more than argumentation (various 
argumentative moves performed) and nothing but arguments (the as-
sertives based on the imaginary scenario indeed have the function of con-
vincing). A more appropriate and more basic formulation would be: ‘What 
kind of argumentative moves are exchanged in a thought experiment?’
With the help of tools developed in the pragma-dialectical theory of ar-
gumentation, I have attempted to give an answer to this latter question. A 
thought experiment was reconstructed as a series of argumentative moves 
performed in an academic discussion on the acceptability of a claim. Some 
of these argumentative moves were indeed instances of argumentation, 
this	argumentation	resembled,	albeit	at	a	 superficial	 level,	a	reductio ad 
8 Additionally, the reconstruction might constitute a basis for providing an answer to 
the epistemological question regarding the novelty of the thought experimenter’s conclu-
sion, viz. How can a thought experimenter produce new knowledge without any claim 
concerning how the world is? If the reconstructed argumentation structure is correct, the 
answer seems to be: by basing his argumentation exclusively on conditional statements, 
i.e. not on claims about how the world is but on claims about how the world would be. This 
needs, of course, further investigation.
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absurdum. But the rest of the interaction was equally important and the 
pragma-dialectical reconstruction has hopefully emphasized this point. It 
is through the complex interaction of two disagreeing parties that thought 
experiments are carried out. Consequently, it is through a systematic treat-
ment of this interaction that thought experiments can be better understood 
as forms of academic activity. 
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